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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Frank Donald Marks appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury
verdicts finding him guilty of three counts of lewd conduct.

Marks claims the

district court erred in making certain evidentiary rulings and abused its
sentencing discretion.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The state charged Marks with three counts of lewd conduct for sexually
molesting three different victims - two biological daughters, B.M. and K.M., and
his stepdaughter, C.M.1

(R., pp.44-45; Tr.2, p.792, Ls.2-3, p.800, L.7 - p.804,

L.24, p.886, Ls.11-14, p.891, L.25 - p.895, L.19, p.1025, Ls.19-23, p.1029, L.13
- p.1 034, L.2.) Marks pled not guilty and the first trial resulted in a mistrial due to
a deadlocked jury. (R., p.262.) Before the second trial, Marks entered a guilty
plea to one count of lewd conduct pursuant to a plea agreement with the state,
but the court allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing and the
case proceeded to trial a second time. (R., pp.417-423, 456-457, 460-462, 464465.)
At the conclusion of the second trial, the jury found Marks guilty of all

1 Although C.M. is referred to as Marks' stepdaughter, Marks was only engaged
to C.M.'s mother; they were never married. (See Tr., p.791, Ls.6-7, p.794, Ls.215.)

2 There are three transcripts included in the record on appeal. The transcript that
includes the trials, sentencing, and several hearings will be referred to as "Tr.";
any other transcript references will be based upon the date of the hearing.

1

three counts of lewd conduct. (R., pp.641-642.) The court imposed concurrent
life sentences with 30 year fixed. (R., pp.664-667.) Marks filed a rule 35 motion,
which the district court denied. (R., pp.668, 689.) Marks filed timely notices of
appeal from the Judgment and the order denying Rule 35 relief.
674, 692-694.)
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(R., pp.670-

ISSUES
Marks states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err, and violate Mr. Marks' constitutional
rights to due process, to present witnesses, and to present a
defense, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment, when
it prevented his medical expert from testifying at trial?

2.

Did the district court err when it permitted the presentation of
404(b) evidence?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed
concurrent, unified life sentences, with thirty years fixed,
following Mr. Marks' convictions on three count of lewd
conduct, especially in light of his having passed two
polygraphs concerning the charges?

4.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when, in light of the
new information provided, most notably the fact that the
victims felt the sentences were too harsh, it denied Mr.
Marks' Rule 35 motion?

(Appellant's Brief, p.3.)

The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
Has Marks failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in
denying his motion to have a doctor, who never examined any of the victims,
testify that one of the victims was not sexually abused?
2.
Has Marks failed to show error in the district court's determination that
testimony from a fourth daughter abused by Marks was permissible pursuant to
I.R.E.404(b)?
3.
Has Marks failed to show the district court abused its sentencing
discretion by imposing concurrent unified life sentences with 30 years fixed upon
the jury verdicts finding Marks guilty of engaging in lewd conduct with three of his
daughters? Has Marks likewise failed to show an abuse of discretion in the
district court's denial of Marks' request for Rule 35 relief?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Marks Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Excluding His Proposed Expert Testimony
A.

Introduction
Marksasserts the district court "erred, and violated his constitutional rights

to due process, to present witnesses, and to present a defense, under the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments when it prevented his medical expert from
testifying at triaL" (Appellant's Brief, pA.) More specifically, Marks contends the
court erroneously prohibited Dr. Stephen Guertin from testifying, based on his
review of medical records, that K.M. was not sexually abused given the lack of
any indication that her hymen was transected as he would expect if Marks had
vaginal intercourse with her as she alleged. (Appellant's Brief, pp.14-16.) Marks
also asserts that, "to the extent that the Rules of Evidence do apply to bar Dr.
Guertin's testimony, . . . they must yield to his constitutional rights to due
process, to present witnesses, and to present a defense under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments."

(Appellant's Brief, p.16.)

Marks' claims fail.

The

district court properly exercised its discretion in excluding Dr. Guertin's testimony
and Marks is incorrect in his assertion that his constitutional rights trump
evidentiary rules.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The decision whether to admit evidence at trial is generally within the

province of the trial court." State v. Healy, 151 Idaho 734, 736, 264 P.3d 75, 77
(Ct. App. 2011). A trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony will
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not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. State v.
Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 645, 962 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1998); State v. Winn, 121
Idaho 850,855,828 P.2d 879,884 (1992).

C.

Marks Has Failed To Show Error In The Exclusion Of Dr. Guertin's
Testimony
Prior to the second trial, Marks disclosed that he intended to call Dr.

Stephen Guertin as an expert. (R., p.313.) Dr. Guertin set forth his opinion in a
letter in which he concluded:
In short, I believe that there are credibility issues with [S.M., K.M.
and C.M.]. Some, I believe, are extreme. I don't know if a physical
examination of [C.M.] was ever done, but certainly a normal
examination of the external genitalia of [K.M.] would not be what
one would expect given allegations of hundreds of episodes of
penile/vaginal intercourse beginning during the prepubertal period.
It would be interesting to me, as well, to know whether or not your
client, Mr. Franks, was willing to take a lie detector test and/or what
the results of it were. More so, would be interesting to know
whether or not any of these teenagers were asked to take a lie
detector test, what their responses were to these requests and/or
the results.
(R., p.348.) Dr. Guertin's opinion was based on his review of police department

records, "preliminary trial transcripts from July 2009," "the jury trial transcripts
from June 2010" of S.M., K.M., and C.M., and medical records for S.M., S.K.M.,
and K.M. (R., p.341.) With respect to his review of the victims' medical records,3

3 The disclosure and proper use of the victims' medical records was the subject
of debate before the district court. (See,~, Tr., pp.520-532; R., pp.287, 29193, 311, 336-339.) The court ultimately authorized release of those records for
review by Dr. Guertin and those records have been augmented to the record on
appeal as confidential exhibits. (R., p.311; Order Granting Revised Motion to
Augment the Record dated May 10, 2013 (italics original).)
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Dr. Guertin noted (1) B.M.'s "anogenital examination" on July 27, 2009, "was
completely normal"; (2) B.K.M.'s examination on the same date was also
"normal"; and (3) the "examination of [K.M.'s] external genitalia, which should
have included an examination of the hymen, was norma!."

(R., p.346.)

Dr.

Guertin further commented that B.M.'s "physical examination neither confirms
nor negates [her] allegations" but he would expect that the sexual activity
recounted by K.M. would have resulted in a "complete transaction of the hymen,"
which should have been noted in the medical record. (R., p.347.) Dr. Guertin
also found it "notable that a speculum examination of [K.M.] could not be done"
since, according to Dr. Guertin, "a child who had had recurrent episodes of
penile/vaginal intercourse, extending up through age 13 years or so, it would be
expected that a speculum could be admitted without discomfort." (R., p.347.)
Dr. Guertin did not, however, have the results of a planned examination of K.M.
under anesthesia. (R., p.348.)
The state filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Guertin, asserting
the medical records upon which Dr. Guertin relied were privileged and that Dr.
Guertin was not qualified to offer an expert opinion since he never examined any
of the victims. (R., pp.336-351.) At the hearing on the state's motion to exclude,
the court found that Marks failed to meet his burden of establishing Dr. Guertin's
testimony was admissible but gave Marks additional time to file a brief and
submit authority to support his position. (Tr., p.586, L.21 - p.588, L.13.)
In response, Marks filed a "Brief in Support of Expert Witness."
pp.360-369.)

(R.,

Marks argued Dr. Guertin's testimony was "proper under Idaho
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Rules of Evidence 702 and 401," was "not excludable under Idaho Rule of
Evidence 503," and claimed he had a constitutional right to present Dr. Guertin's
testimony. (R, p.360.) More specifically, Marks asserted, in relevant part: ''The
key issue for the jury to decide is whether or not the alleged victims are telling
the truth .. "

[H]aving available exam records, that the court has previously

deemed forensic exam records, and having an expert testify about the lack of
physical evidence is relevant for the jurors to hear."4 (R, p.363.) The state
again objected and the court held another hearing.

(R., pp.383-387; see

generally Tr., pp.591-603.) At that hearing, Marks made the following proffer in
addition to referencing Dr. Guertin's opinion letter:
[Dr. Guertin] will testify that he has been involved in alleged sexual
assault and sexual abuse cases and done exams. He will testify as
to the standard protocol of what is to be done as with the medical
procedure when a person has alleged sexual assault. He will
testify about his review of the medical records, what was done and
what was not done and what is there in the findings in those
medical reviews.
. .. I think it's clear the part of his opinion that talks about
the standard protocol as to what's done medically, what a medical
exam has done in these cases and what was and was not done in
this case and what was done, what it showed.
(Tr., p.597, Ls.1-13.)
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied Marks' request to allow
Dr. Guertin to testify (Tr., p.598, L.21 - p.601, L.8) after which the court and
defense counsel engaged in the following exchange:

4 Marks also argued he had a right to confront the victims with their medical
records. (R, pp.368-369.) Marks does not, however, pursue this claim on
appeal. (Appellant's Brief, p.6 n.3.)
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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Would I be allowed to call Dr. Guertin to
talk about what a standard sex assault examination is like?
THE COURT: I don't know that he's qualified to offer that opinion
unless he is familiar with the standard of care in Idaho. I think it's
pretty far out there.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If he is, if he is familiar with the standard
of care in Idaho, would I be allowed to call him then?
THE COURT: If he can establish this was in fact a forensic
examination. I don't think it is.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That leads to my next question then.
believe previously when we received medical records we were not
allowed, nor was Dr. Guertin allowed, to talk to the physician that
did the exam. Would the Court modify that to allow my office either
myself or my investigator or Dr. Guertin or both to speak with the
physician that did the exams?
THE COURT: What's the reservation about talking to the physician
who did the exam?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That's who I would like to talk to. The
Court ordered me not to before. And I would like to know if I can
do that now.
THE COURT: I am going to take that under advisement.
(Tr., p.601, L.17 - p.602, L.16.)
After the hearing, the court entered the following order in relation to Dr.
Guertin's testimony and Marks' request to inquire of the examining physician:
1.

The State's motion to exclude Dr. Guertin's testimony
regarding the credibility of the victims is granted, as it is
improper for an expert to provide such testimony. State v.
Johnson, 119 Idaho 852, 857, 810 P.2d 1138, 1143 (Ct.
App. 1991). Dr. Guertin's testimony is also inadmissible as it
pertains to his analysis of the examination performed by Dr.
Martin, based upon the written medical records of the
victims. This testimony is inadmissible as Dr. Guertin's
conclusions are speculative, and the probative value of his
testimony would be substantially outweighed by the danger
of undue prejudice and confusion under I.R.E 403.
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2.

Defense counsel and defense counsel's investigator are
permitted to speak with the treating physician, Dr. Martin,
concerning the physical examination of the victims herein.

3.

Defendant's request to allow Dr. Guertin to speak to Dr.
Martin directly is denied.

4.

Defendant's verbal supplemental motion to call Dr. Guertin
to testify about standards for forensic sexual abuse
examinations and medical observations which are typically
present in victims of sexual abuse is denied, as the Court
finds that this testimony is speculative, and the risk of unfair
prejudice and jury confusion substantially outweigh the
testimony's probative value under I.R.E 403. Additionally,
this testimony would not assist the trier of fact, under I.R.E.
702.

(R., pp.392-393.)
Four months later, Marks filed a motion to reconsider the exclusion of Dr.
Guertin's testimony "on the grounds that the issues left outstanding from the
previous hearing where the expert was excluded can now be addressed." (R.,
p.472.)

In support of the motion, Marks filed an affidavit from Dr. Guertin in

which Dr. Guertin averred he is "familiar with the medical procedures, testing
techniques, and standards that are practiced nationally when investigating
allegations of sexual penetration by a child," is "versed in the standard exams
which are conducted for persons alleging sexual abuse by penetration, along
with the information those exams will produce," and "that if proper examination is
conducted after allegations of sexual abuse, the examiner should be able to
identify specific changes in female anatomy." (R., p.475.)
The court conducted another hearing on whether Dr. Guertin would be
allowed to testify at which defense counsel argued that she was not asking Dr.
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Guertin to "talk about the inconsistencies in the testimony" but wanted him to
testify about "when somebody is accused of sexual assault what happens to the
person doing the accusing, the alleged victim, the kind of exam that is accepted
nationally" and "what happens in the female human body as a result of those
kind of allegations, and what was not present in the examination that was done."
(Tr., p.642, Ls.6-8, 19-21.) The court denied the motion to reconsider, stating:
In this case the Court does not have any affidavit under oath
with regard to the opinions the doctor is going to offer if he is
allowed to testify. I have gone back and looked at the Johnson
decision and I think it is on point. In Johnson the analysis was as
follows, and that's 119 Idaho 852, a 1991 court of appeals case,
which stands for the proposition that a doctor is not necessarily
qualified to speak as an expert but also provides an analysis on the
question of when a doctor's opinion invades the province of the
jury. The analysis is lengthy in the Johnson case, but, for instance,
it indicates by citing another case with approval a doctor is not
qualified to offer opinions with regard to such abuse, if the doctor's
opinion is based upon a single visit between the doctor and the
victim. We have no visit here.
An oral history by the doctor elicited from the victim. We
have some limited oral history from the medical records of Dr.
Martin.
A physical finding of the absence of a hymen. That existed
at least as to one of the children.
And that the victim became upset and frightened with the
doctor when the pelvic exam was started.
That physician was not qualified to offer an opinion because
he didn't have a proper factual basis with regard to what had
occurred. And that's the thrust of this Court's decision.
To allow this physician to offer an opinion with regard to
whether sexual abuse occurred as alleged or not requires that the
Court and Dr. Guertin assume Dr. Martin performed a forensic
examination based upon allegations of sexual abuse. The medical
records themselves do not speak to that. It indicates they were
based upon a request for a well child check, or welfare check.
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And, in essence, Dr. Guertin would be testifying as to what Dr.
Martin had to have seen under the circumstances. And the Court
finds that to be too speculative. The prejudicial value exceeds the
risk of any probability of the likelihood of the evidence under 403,
as the Court previously concluded. It tends to shift the focus of the
case and try to have the doctor in essence offer testimony that Dr.
Martin would have seen different things if this abuse had occurred
as consistent with the child's -- the children's testimony.
(Tr., p.645, L.13 - p.647, L.4.)
Marks then asked if the court would allow Dr. Guertin to "testify about
what the standard of practice is without talking about Dr. Martin's examination of
[K.M.] and [B.M.]" and whether defense counsel could "speak to Dr. Martin about
the[ ] medical records."

(Tr., p.647, Ls.7-9, 12-14.) The court denied Marks'
"

request related to Dr. Guertin's testimony and, consistent with its prior written
order, told defense counsel she was "free to contact" Dr. Martin but stated it
would not "order her to speak to" defense counsel, assuming Dr. Martin would
"assert a HIPPA [sic] rule." (Tr., p.647, Ls.11, 15-17.)
On appeal, Marks argues the district court "erred, and violated his
constitutional rights" in excluding Dr. Guertin's testimony and that the "court's
reliance on Johnson was misplaced." (Appellant's Brief, pp.4, 11.) Application
of the law to the facts presented to the district court shows otherwise.
Expert testimony is only admissible if it "assist[s] the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." State v. Joslin, 145
Idaho 75, 81, 175 P.3d 764, 770 (2007) (quotations omitted); see also I.R.E.
702. "[A] witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." I.R.E.
702. "The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
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opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at
or before the hearing." !.R.E. 703.
In essence, Marks wanted Dr. Geurtin to testify about what he believed
Dr. Martin's examination of K.M. would have entailed based on "national
standards" and his opinion, based on reviewing the medical records, that K.M.
was not abused in the manner she claimed because he would have expected Dr.
Martin's findings to be different if K.M. was telling the truth. 5 The fundamental
flaw in Dr. Guertin's proposed testimony was that he lacked any foundation for
his opinions about what Dr. Martin did and saw during her examination of K.M.;
or, as characterized by the district court, Dr. Guertin's testimony was entirely
speculative. (Tr., p.646, Ls.20-23.) While Dr. Guertin may have the ability to be
qualified as an expert on issues involving child sexual abuse including the ability
to offer opinions about standard medical examinations that are conducted in
such cases and physical findings that may be indicative of child abuse, he had
no basis for offering an opinion on whether Dr. Martin actually examined K.M.'s
hymen. Just because he expected her to, does not mean she did and whether

Because C.M. was not examined, Dr. Guertin could not have an opinion on the
issue. Nor could Dr. Guertin have a relevant opinion about the findings during
B.K.M.'s exam because, at the time B.K.M. met with Dr. Martin, she denied any
abuse and, according to the report, Dr. Martin did not perform an anal or genital
exam on her. With respect to B.M., Dr. Guertin stated in his letter that the
"importance" of her "examination is that it is consistent with her history that there
was no penile/vaginal sexual activity" and that "the physical examination neither
confirms nor negates [her] allegations." (R., p.347.) As such, Dr. Guertin would
presumably not offer an opinion that the physical findings in relation to B.M.'s
exam did not support her allegations. Thus, the only medical records Dr. Guertin
could opine about in terms of the type of exam that "should" have been done and
what the record "should" reflect relate to K.M. The state's argument will be
limited accordingly.
5
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she acted in compliance with "national standards" was irrelevant. See !.R.E. 401
(defining relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence").
As for Dr. Martin's findings on physically examining K.M., the only "facts or
data" known to Dr. Guertin was what is contained in Dr. Martin's report.
relevant part of that report states:

The

"Genital findings were normal externally,

unable to perform speculum exam due to patient's anxiety and refusal."
(Confidential Exhibit.)

Dr. Guertin found this conclusion "very important"

because, according to him, he would have "expected" "significant injury" based
on the abuse described by K.M. (R., p.347.) Specifically, Dr. Guertin noted a
"[t]ypical injury in a child that young would have included a complete transection
of the hymen" and, he stated, "[t]ransections of the hymen persist" or, "[i]n other
words, the expected transection would have or should have still been there." (R.,
p.347.) Although Dr. Guertin believes Dr. Martin's examination of K.M.'s external
genitalia "would have included an examination of the hymen" (R., p.347) he has
no actual knowledge that it did.

In fact, the medical record reflects Dr. Martin

had difficulty in fully examining K.M.'s genitalia due to K.M.'s "anxiety and
refusal" to allow insertion of a speculum.

(Confidential Exhibit.)

While Dr.

Guertin apparently interprets this as a "notable" indication that K.M. was lying
given her claims of "recurrent episodes of penile/vaginal intercourse, extending
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up through age 13 years or so" (R., p.347 6 ), though the state can think of a
number of reasons for K.M.'s reaction that have no bearing on her credibility,
there is no basis for concluding that Dr. Martin did not actually experience that
resistance. Indeed, the medical records indicate an effort to schedule K.M. for
examination under anesthesia as a result of Dr. Martin's difficulty - a point Dr.
Guertin acknowledges, even stating the "results of that examination are
important to know."

(R., pp.347-348.)

Regardless, even if Dr. Martin's

examination of the external genitalia should have included the hymen, her
performance was not at issue and what she should or should not have done as
part of the examination is, as previously noted, irrelevant.

If Marks wished to

explore the scope of Dr. Martin's examination and her precise findings, he should
have subpoenaed her.

7

Also missing from Dr. Guertin's proffered opinion is any basis for
concluding that Dr. Martin's characterization of K.M.'s genitalia as "normal
externally" means K.M.'s hymen showed no signs of penile penetration. That an
"examiner should be able to identify specific changes in female anatomy" (R.,
p.475) does not necessarily mean any such change places the anatomy outside

6 Dr. Guertin's letter actually misstates the medical record. He writes, "in a child
who had recurrent episodes of penile/vaginal intercourse, extending up through
age 13 years or so, it would be expected that a speculum could be admitted
without discomfort." (R., p.347 (emphasis added).) Unless Dr. Guertin equates
"discomfort" with "[a]nxiety and refusal," as opposed to pain, the medical records
do not support his statement.

The state does not interpret the district court's refusal to "order" Dr. Martin to
"talk" to counsel as a prohibition on subpoenaing her to testify at trial. Moreover,
the state did not find any indication in the record that Dr. Martin actually refused
to talk to counsel.
7
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of the normal range or that any given examiner will document changes even if
those changes are considered normal. Surely sexually active females who have
a transected hymen as a result of that activity will still have genitalia that are
considered "normal."
Significantly, Dr. Martin's report does not conclude that K.M. was not
abused.

Instead, in the "Assessment" portion of her report, Dr. Martin wrote:

"Sexual abuse by dad[.]" (Confidential Exhibit.) Thus, the one professional who
actually examined K.M. did not conclude, as Dr. Guertin has without ever seeing
the child, that K.M. was not abused.

It was this lack of foundation for Dr.

Guertin's opinion that was at the core of the district court's decision to exclude it.
Marks also contends that, even assuming the Rules of Evidence
"somehow bar the presentation of Dr. Guertin's testimony, any such rule or rules
may not be applied to exclude the proffered testimony under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution

. because Dr.

Guertin's testimony was 'relevant,' 'material,' and 'vital' to the defense."
(Appellant's Brief, p.18.) Marks is incorrect.
Marks' constitutional argument is based on general principles recognized
by the Supreme Court that a criminal defendant has a right to present a defense,
a principle the state does not, and would not, dispute. Marks, however, fails to
acknowledge the equally well-established principle that "[t]he Rules of Evidence
embody the balancing test which safeguards a defendant's constitutional right to
present a defense along with protection of the state's interest in the integrity of
the criminal trial process." State v. Meister 148 Idaho 236, 240, 220 P.3d 1055,
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1059 (2009).

Thus, if evidence is deemed inadmissible under the applicable

rules, the constitutional right to present a defense does not override exclusion of
the evidence.

kL.;

see State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, _ , 264 P.3d 54, 59

(2011) (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (noting the
defendant's failure to provide "any authority holding that the exclusion of
irrelevant evidence violates a defendant's right to confront the witnesses against
him").

As recently reiterated by the Supreme Court:

"The Constitution

guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense, but we have also recognized that state and federal rulemakers have
broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from
criminal trials."

Nevada v. Jackson, 133 S.Ct. 1990, 1992 (2013) (citations,

quotations and brackets omitted).

Marks' claimed constitutional violation in

relation to the exclusion of Dr. Guertin's testimony fails.

D.

Even If Marks Can Establish Error In The Exclusion Of Dr. Guertin's
Testimony, The Error Is Harmless
Even if the district court erred in denying Marks' request to have Dr.

Guertin testify that they physical findings in K.M.'s exam were inconsistent with
her claim of vaginal penetration, any such error is harmless.
"If the Court finds that the district court abused its discretion in admitting
or excluding the evidence, then the Court must declare a belief beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the outcome of the trial, in order to
find that the error was harmless and not reversible." State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho
584, _ , 301 P.3d 242, 256 (2013) (citation omitted). "In other words, the error
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is harmless if the Court finds that the result would be the same without the error."

There was overwhelming evidence presented at trial that Marks sexually
abused all four of his daughters. 8 Moreover, K.M. alleged more than just vaginal
penetration. She also testified that Marks also engaged in anal and oral sex with
her and the lewd conduct involving K.M. was charged in the alternative. (Tr.,
p.900, L.12 - p.901, L.7.) Given the scope and extent of the allegations by all of
Marks' victims, this Court can easily conclude the result would have been the
same even if the jury heard Dr. Guertin's testimony about K.M. Compare State
v. Aguilar, 154 Idaho 201, _ , 296 P.3d 407, 411 (Ct. App. 2012) (finding
erroneous admission of expert testimony harmless in part "the evidence adduced
at trial was overwhelming that Aguilar committed lewd conduct with three minors
under the age of sixteen,,).9

As will be discussed in Section II, infra, Marks' other daughter, B.K.M. testified
pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) as Marks' lewd conduct perpetrated on her was
charged in a separate case due to the timing of B.K.M.'s disclosure, which was
approximately one year after her sisters' disclosures.
8

9 Even if the Court cannot find the error harmless, the state submits this would
only impact the jury's verdict with respect to K.M. for the reasons noted in
footnote 5, supra.
17

II.
Marks Has Failed To Establish Error In The District Court's Admission Of 404(b)
Evidence Relating To Marks' Abuse Of His Daughter, B.K.M.
A.

Introduction
Although Marks was not charged in this case with sexually molesting his

third biological daughter, B.K.M.,10 prior to the second trial, the state filed a
notice of intent to introduce evidence that Marks also molested her. (Notice of
Intent to to [sic] Use I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence ("Notice of Intent") (augmentation).11)
Marks filed an objection "on the grounds that the 404(b) is not proper material
[sic]." (R., pA70.) After a hearing on the issue, the court admitted the evidence.
(Tr., p.654, Ls.11-25.) Marks contends on appeal that this ruling was erroneous,
claiming the court failed to "engage[e] in the analysis and review required under
applicable legal standards" and "even assuming such compliance, the prior acts
were irrelevant propensity evidence inadmissible under Rule 404." (Appellant's
Brief, p.18.) To the contrary, review of the applicable legal standards shows the
district court did not err in its analysis nor in its conclusion that the evidence was
admissible.

10 Because two of Marks' daughters have the initials B.M., consistent with the
Appellant's Brief, the state will refer to the allegations involving the daughter who
was the subject of the 404(b) evidence as "B.K.M." Although Marks engaged in
similar conduct with B.K.M., she did not disclose it until later at which time the
state charged Marks with lewd conduct against B.K.M. in a separate case. (See
Tr., p.609, L.24 - p.61 0, LA, p.626, LsA-11; see generally Tr., pp.650-654.) The
state, at one point, sought to consolidate the cases, but ultimately withdrew that
motion for scheduling reasons. (See R., p.18; see generally 7/22/20011 Tr.)
11 Contemporaneous with this brief, the state filed a motion to augment the
record with the state's Notice of Intent, filed July 8, 2011, as well as the State's
Response to Defendant's Motion to Exclude Rule 404(b) Evidence, filed July 29,
2011.
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B.

Standard Of Review
Rulings under !.R.E. 404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard:

whether the evidence is admissible for a purpose other than propensity is given
free review while the determination of whether the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49,51,205 P.3d
1185, 1187 (2009).

C.

Marks Has Failed To Show Error In The Admission Of B.K.M.'s Testimony
At trial, B.K.M. testified, similar to her siblings, that Marks began sexually

abusing her when she was eight- or nine-years old. (Tr., p.1002, L.12 - p.1 005,
L.22.)

B.K.M. specifically described specific instances of sexual abuse and

testified the abuse occurred until she was 13-years-old, at which time she told
Marks "it had to stop." (Tr., p.1006, LsA-16.) B.K.M. did not disclose the abuse
at the time it was occurring or at the same time her sisters did; rather, she first
disclosed the abuse in counseling approximately one year after Marks was
arrested. (Tr., p.1 011, L.11 - p.1 012, L.3.)
Marks proffers two claims of error in relation to the district court's decision
to admit B.K.M.'s testimony:

(1) the district court failed to "engag[e] in the

analysis and review required under applicable legal standards," and (2) even if
the court engaged in the required analysis, it erred in admitting B.K.M.'s
testimony." (Appellant's Brief, p.18.) Both of Marks' arguments fail.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) states:
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Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person
acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, provided that the prosecution in a criminal case shall file
and serve notice reasonably in advance of trial ... , of the general
nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
Thus, although evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove a defendant's criminal propensity, "such evidence may be admissible for a
purpose other than that prohibited by !.R.E. 404(b)." State v. Gomez, 151 Idaho
146, 150, 254 P.3d 47, 51 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Avila, 137 Idaho 410,
412, 49 P.3d 1260, 1262 (Ct. App. 2002)). ''The enumerated 'other purposes' for
which evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts may be admitted is not
exhaustive." State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 18, 878 P.2d 188, 192 (Ct. App.
1994) (citations omitted).
"In determining the admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts, the
Supreme Court has utilized a two-tiered analysis." Gomez, 151 Idaho at 150,
254 P.3d at 51. "The first tier involves a two-part inquiry: (1) whether there is
sufficient evidence to establish the prior bad acts as fact; and (2) whether the
prior bad acts are relevant to a material disputed issue concerning the crime
charged, other than propensity."

kL (citing

State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205

P.3d 1185, 1188 (2009)). The appellate court will defer to the trial court's factual
determination that there is sufficient evidence to establish the prior bad act as
fact if it is supported by SUbstantial and competent evidence but will review any
relevancy determination de novo.

Gomez, 151 Idaho at 150, 254 P.3d at 51

(citations omitted).
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With respect to his claim that the district court failed to engage in the
proper analysis, Marks specifically argues the court "skipped the first step of the
analysis when it failed to make a finding as to whether there was sufficient
evidence to establish the fact of the other crime." (Appellant's Brief, p.21.) The
Idaho Court of Appeals has held, "the district court is only required to make a
specific articulation as to whether the prior conduct occurred if that question is
squarely at issue. If the question is at issue, a specific articulation is necessary
for the determination of relevance." Gomez, 151 Idaho at 151, 254 P.3d at 52
(citing Cooke v. State, 149 Idaho 233,240,233 P.3d 164, 171 (Ct. App. 2010)).
Marks contends a specific articulation was required because, he asserts,
whether the abuse of B.K.M. occurred was put at issue when he "questioned the
validity of the proffered evidence." (Appellant's Brief, pp.21-22 n.12.)
The "proffered evidence" was "submitted under seal as an attachment" to
the State's Response to Defendant's Motion to Exclude Rule 404(b) Evidence
("404(b) Brief") and included the reports identified in the state's 404(b) notice and
"a

recording

(Augmentation.

from
12

)

the

preliminary hearing

in which

[B.K.M.] testified."

At the 404(b) hearing, counsel for Marks argued that B. K.M.'s

testimony was "propensity evidence" that did not "meet[ ] the 404(b) accepted

As previously noted, contemporaneous with this brief, the state filed a motion
to augment the record with the State's response to Defendant's Motion to
Exclude Rule 404(b) Evidence. The reports submitted under seal as part of the
state's 404(b) Brief are not included nor is the recording of the preliminary
hearing referenced therein.
However, missing portions of the record are
presumed to support the district court's decision. State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538,
541, 835 P .2d 1349, 1352 (Ct. App. 1992) (missing portions of the record are
presumed to support the actions of the court below).
12
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values" and, even if it did, it was "far more prejudicial" than probative.

13

(Tr.,

p.652, Ls.1-5.) Counsel for Marks then argued:
Your Honor, I think that the Court also has the ability to
exclude the evidence just based on fairness to Mr. Marks. The
Court has long been on this case, and if we look at this particular
case, the allegations that [B.K.M.] now makes and did not at first,
the Court is well aware that she was questioned and said nothing
happened to her. It took a year. And I think we were at a hung jury
when she decided something did happen to her and then talked to
law enforcement. It took the state another eight to ten months to
bother to file charges, even though the police report had been
made.
Your Honor, this is a situation where, if the state wanted that
evidence in, that charge could have been joined with these
charges. We would have argued that in a different way. That
certainly is something that could be done. It is not Mr. Marks' fault
that the state sat on those charges for months and months and
months and then filed them late. We went through the process of
are we going to join that charge with these charges. We couldn't
do it and get our subpoenas done on the week that Judge Luster
could have then heard the case, so we are in this place where Mr.
Marks is set for trial in three counts with you next week. The
charge with [B.K.M.] the state now wants to use with as 404(b) is
going to happen sometime in the future.
In think that is unfair prejudice to Mr. Marks to allow her
testimony to come into this trial. The jury is not going to be skilled
in the legal standards. It will be used just simply as propensity
evidence by them. And it is just plain not fair to let it come in in this
fashion. We would ask the Court to exclude [B.K.M.'s] testimony
from this trial.
(Tr., p.652, L.12 - p.653, L.18.)
Marks cites the five lines italicized in the foregoing argument by trial
counsel to support his claim that he "questioned the validity of the proffered

13 Marks' written objection, filed prior to the hearing and in response to the state's
initial notice, only objected "to the state using 404(b) evidence on the grounds
that the 404(b) is not proper materiaL" (R., p.470.)
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evidence."

(Appellant's Brief, pp.21-22 n.12.) When read in context, the five

lines upon which Marks relies do not support his assertion that he put the
question of whether the abuse occurred at issue, much less squarely at issue.
As such, Marks has failed to show error in the district court's failure to specifically
find there was sufficient evidence to establish the abuse of B.K.M. as "fact."
Gomez, supra.

Even if trial counsel's arguments were sufficient to place the

question at issue, Marks has failed to articulate any reason the information
provided in support of the 404(b) Brief and the fact that a court found probable
cause to bind Marks over for lewd conduct involving B.K.M. was not sufficient
evidence from which a "reasonable jury could believe that the conduct actually
occurred." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667 n.2, 227 P.3d 918, 921 n.2
(2010) (citations omitted).
Marks' second claim of error in relation to B.K.M.'s testimony is that the
court "failed to conduct the type of careful examination mandated by the Idaho
Supreme Court with respect to whether the testimony of [B.K.M.] met the
requirements of admissibility of prior acts evidence." (Appellant's Brief, p.22.)
According to Marks, the district court abused its discretion because, he argues,
the court's "reasoning was conclusory" and therefore an abuse of discretion.
(Appellant's Brief, p.22.)

Marks cites no authority for the proposition that a

district court is required to provide a detailed "analysis" of its reasoning for
admitting 404(b) evidence or risk an appellate conclusion that it abused its
discretion. (See generally Appellant's Brief, p.22.) Indeed, such a requirement
is inconsistent with the well-settled principle that relevance is a question of law
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freely reviewed by this Court.

Gomez, 151 Idaho at 150, 254 P.3d at 150

("Whether evidence is relevant is an issue of law.")
In this case, in deciding B.K.M.'s testimony would be admissible, the
district court concluded "[i]t tend[ed] to show motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, common scheme or plan." (Tr., p.654, Ls.20-21.) The court later
instructed the jury prior to B.K.M.'s testimony that the evidence could only be
considered "for the limited purpose of proving the defendant's opportunity, intent,
or knowledge." (Tr., p.1000, Ls.20-22.) It is unclear whether the district court's
limiting instruction reflected a modification of its pre-trial ruling or whether the
court viewed "knowledge" and "common scheme or plan" as synonymous. See
Grist, 147 Idaho at 54, 205 P.3d at 1190 ("evidence may be admissible for
certain purposes, including 'preparation, plan, knowledge, [and] identity, which
purposes are most frequently grouped together under the rubric of 'common
scheme or plan"') (brackets original). Either way, for the reasons set forth below,
Marks has failed to show error in the admission of B.K.M.'s testimony.
On appeal, Marks appears to challenge only the district court's initial
finding that the evidence was proper to show common scheme or plan.
(Appellant's Brief, p.22 (noting court failed to provide analysis for "why or how
the prior act evidence was admissible as common scheme or plan"), p.24
("evidence that Mr. Marks may have sexually abused another of his daughters by
engaging in similar conduct with her is not relevant in establishing a common
scheme or plan").)

Because "common scheme or plan" was not the only

permissible purpose cited by the district court, and the evidence may not
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ultimately

have been admitted for this purpose anyway given the limiting

instruction, this Court may affirm the admission of the evidence on the
unchallenged bases.

State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366, 956 P.2d 1311,

1313 (Ct. App. 1998) (where a basis for a ruling by a district court is
unchallenged on appeal, appellate court will affirm on the unchallenged basis).
Even if this Court addresses the merits of whether B.K.M.'s testimony was
relevant for a proper purpose under I.R.E. 404(b), Marks' claim that it was not
fails.

B.K.M.'s testimony was relevant for at least two reasons - to show

opportunity and common scheme, or plan, which rebutted Marks' defenses.
A significant part of Marks' defense centered around a claim that he
lacked the opportunity to have sex with his daughters.

During her opening

statement, defense counsel told the jury there were "a lot of people in and out of
the [Marks'] house" (Tr., p.786, L.8) and stated:
[Marks] has had a lot of time to think and to think back and
to think of all the jobs he had, all the hours he worked ... long
hours he worked at [his] job. To think back of all the people talking
about a six-year time span, seven-year time span, thinking of all the
people who had been through his house, his brother Rick and his
brother's wife, Donita, and their children, his niece and (inaudible),
they lived there at the house. How could the girls say something
like this when there was no opportunity for him to do it? He didn't
do this.
He thought about the friends that they had had through the
years, the extra kids that had been in the house, the adoption
process, the school counselor that lived down the street, the times
the kids had been to the doctor. Why would they make these
allegations?
[Marks'] emotions ranged from anger, upset, hurt. He's
here, he's here to tell you about all of those years, all of the people
that came in and out of the house, all of the friends and relatives,
all of the jobs he had, all of the hours he worked, how much he
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loves his children but, most of all, he did not touch anyone of those
girls inappropriately.
(Tr., p.787, L.23 - p.788, L.20).
Consistent with the theme presented in his opening statement, Marks
called a number of witnesses to support his claim of lack of opportunity. Marks'
mother testified she never saw Marks take the girls in the bedroom and lock the
door. (Tr., p.1070, L.23 - p.1071, L.2.) Marks' niece testified that she lived with
the Marks family twice and never saw him take any of the girls into his room.
(Tr., p.1076, L.19 - p.1080, L.15.) Marks' brother, Richard, also testified that
approximately seven years prior, he lived with Marks for "about six, seven
months" and that Marks worked "16 hours a day, seven days a week" and that
both his wife and Marks' wife "basically stayed home" with the children.

(Tr.,

p.1085, L.20 - p.1 088, L.2.) In addition, Richard testified his three children were
staying at the house as well. (Tr., p.1088, Ls.9-13.) Another niece testified that
she, too, lived with the Marks for a period of time and that Marks was "always at
work" and she never saw him take "one of the girls into his room." (Tr., p.1 091,
L.10 - p.1092, L.20.)

Marks called two additional witnesses - one of his

daughters' friends and her mother - who also claimed they never saw Marks take
one of the girls into his room. (Tr., p.1095, L.5 - p.1 096, L.17, p.11 02, Ls.2-24.)
Finally, Marks himself testified and said he worked 10-12 hours a day anywhere
from six to seven days a week depending on the job - although he admitted
there was a period of time when he was laid off for several months. (Tr., p.1195,
Ls.22-24, p.1197, L.23 - p.1198, L.10, p.1203, Ls.1-5, p.1204, L.22 - p.1205,
L.5.)
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During closing argument, defense counsel reiterated the theme that Marks
"worked a lot, really, really long hours" and there were a number of people who
lived with the family who never saw "anything happen." (Tr., p.1278, Ls.3-12,
p.1278, L.23 - p.1284, L.1.) Defense counsel's closing argument included the
following statement: "There are only 24 hours in the day. A person has to sleep
some of them, eat, take a shower, clean the house and mows the lawn. But
when a person works a lot of hours that makes them less available. That makes
the allegations very unlikely." (Tr., p.1284, Ls.2-6.)
Given Marks' claim that he lacked the opportunity to sexually offend
against his daughters, as they claimed, B.K.M.'s testimony was relevant to
corroborate her sisters' assertions to the contrary. Compare Gomez, 151 Idaho
at 154, 254 P .3d at 55 (finding 404(b) evidence "tended to prove that Gomez had
the opportunity to commit the charged crime" and was "relevant to the [victim's]
credibility").

Marks has not acknowledged that the testimony was admitted, in

part, to prove opportunity, much less established admission on this basis was
erroneous.
As noted, Marks has only argued that B.K.M.'s testimony was not relevant
to show a common scheme or plan. Marks is incorrect. Although this Court can
affirm the admission of B.K.M.'s testimony solely on the basis that it was
appropriate to show opportunity, her testimony was also relevant to establish a
common scheme or plan involving Marks sexually molesting each of his
daughters starting when they were around eight-years-old. "Where relevant to
the credibility of the parties, evidence of a common criminal design is
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admissible."

State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 54, 205 P.3d 1185, 1190 (2009)

(quoting State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743,746,819 P.2d 1143,1146 (1991). "If
the common scheme or plan rubric is to be used, there must be common
characteristics that go 'beyond merely showing a criminal propensity.'" State v.
Pepcorn, 152 Idaho 678, 689, 273 P.3d 1271, 1282 (2012) (quoting Johnson,
148 Idaho at 668, 227 P.3d at 922). "In other words, at a minimum, there must
be evidence of a common scheme or plan beyond the bare fact that sexual
misconduct has occurred with children in the past." Johnson, 148 Idaho at 668,
227 P.3d at 922. "The events must be linked by common characteristics that go
beyond merely showing a criminal propensity and instead must objectively tend
to establish that the same person committed all the acts."

!fL

Marks argues that "evidence that [he] may have sexually abused another
of his daughters by engaging in similar conduct with her is not relevant in
establishing a common scheme or plan to abuse the three victims in this case."
(Appellant's Brief, p.24.) In support of this assertion, Marks relies on the Idaho
Supreme Court's opinion in Johnson.

(Appellant's Brief, p.24.)

A review of

Johnson reveals significant differences between that case and this one.
In Johnson, the sate charged the defendant with three counts of lewd
conduct for offenses perpetrated against his daughter "who was between six and
seven years old at the time of the charged conduct." 148 Idaho at 666,227 P.3d
at 920. The trial court permitted the state to introduce evidence, over Johnson's
objection, that he "had molested his younger sister when she was approximately
eight years old and he was between fifteen and sixteen."
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On appeal, the

Idaho Supreme Court concluded the admission of evidence that Johnson
previously

molested his sister was improper, finding it was "irrelevant to the

charged conduct under I.R.E. 404(b)."

& at 668, 227 P.3d at 922 (capitalization

altered). Although the trial court identified three characteristics linking the two
victims - (1) both victims were the same age; (2) both victims viewed Johnson as
an authority figure; and (3) in both cases, Johnson asked the victim to touch his
penis - the Court found these similarities "are sadly far too unremarkable to
demonstrate a 'common scheme or plan' in Johnson's behavior."

& at 669,227

P.3d at 923. According to the Court, "The facts that the two victims in this case
are juvenile females and that Johnson is a family member are precisely what
make these incidents unfortunately quite ordinary."

&

Unlike in Johnson, Marks' abuse of B.K.M. was not a prior event with no
temporal connection to or relationship with the molestation of his three other
daughters.

Instead, it was integral to a pattern of behavior by Marks involving

him beginning to sexually abuse each daughter once they reached a certain age.
And, the abuse Marks perpetrated on all of his daughters was similar in nature. 14

14 With respect to the "similarities supporting the common scheme or plan
justification," Marks contends it is "worth noting that, while two of the named
victims claimed that the first instance of abuse occurred when all three were
present, B.K.M. testified that the abuse first occurred when she and Mr. Marks
were alone and never involved anyone else." (Appellant's Brief, p.24 (citations
and footnote omitted).) The state fails to see the significance in this. The three
victims involved in the "first instance" of abuse were B.M., K.M., and C.M., all of
whom were born in July 1994, and were, therefore, the same age when Marks
abused them together. B.K.M., on the other hand, was born in 1996 and, given
that Marks began abusing his daughters when they turned eight-years-old, he did
not start abusing her until two years later. Moreover, after the first incident
involving the three older girls, it appears many of Marks' subsequent acts of lewd
conduct were perpetrated on the girls individually rather than as a group.
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B.K.M.'s testimony also refuted Marks' implication that B.M. and K.M., who were
twins, manufactured the allegations because Marks grounded K.M. for going to a
sleepover where there was alcohol 15 and were somehow persuaded or
influenced by a friend's mother, Deanna, who had previously disclosed her own
abuse to them, to claim they were abused as well. (See Tr., p.832, L.11 - p.836,
L.22, p.936, L.5 - p.937, L.11, p.1288, L.24 - p.1291, L.5.) It also refuted the
argument that C. M. lied about the abuse because she hated Marks, "not
because he molested her for a lot of years," but "because he argues and fights
with her and grounds her."

(Tr. p.1288, Ls.17-23.)

B.K.M.'s testimony

establishes Marks planned to, and did, sexually abuse all of his daughters and
directly refutes Marks' claim at trial that three of the four daughters lied about it
out of spite because they were upset about being in trouble and/or had the story
planted in their heads by Deanna. Marks' claim that B.K.M.'s testimony was only
relevant to show propensity is belied by the record.
Marks further contends "the probative value of the evidence was minimal
considering the fact that the State already had the testimony of three witnesses
who all reported similar instances of abuse comprising the accusations for which
[he] was on triaL" (Appellant's Brief, p.22.)

Marks complains this "minimal

probative value ... was substantially outweighed by the prejudice suffered ... in
a jury hearing of alleged bad acts about which the jury was not asked to reach a
verdict."

(Appellant's Brief, p.22.)

Marks has failed to show the district court

Counsel even repeated this claim at sentencing in asking the court to
"consider that these allegations arose after the girls were disciplined for
drinking." (Tr., p.1334, Ls.1214.)
15
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abused its discretion in weighing the probative value of the evidence against its
potential for unfair prejudice.
Pursuant to I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if, in the
district court's discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice -- which is the tendency
to suggest a decision on an improper basis -- substantially outweighs the
probative value of the evidence. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d
720, 722 (2010); State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 907 (Ct.
App. 1994); State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651,656,862 P.2d 343, 348 (Ct. App.
1993).

Rule 403 does not offer protection against evidence that is merely

prejudicial in the sense of being detrimental to a party's case.

See State v.

Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285, 290, 775 P.2d 599, 604 (1989) ("Certainly that evidence
was prejudicial to the defendant, however, almost all evidence in a criminal trial
is demonstrably admitted to prove the case of the state, and thus results in
prejudice to a defendant."). Rather, the rule protects only against evidence that
is unfairly prejudicial, that is, evidence that tends to suggest a decision on an
improper basis.

Floyd, 125 Idaho at 654, 873 P.2d at 908.

The weighing

required under Rule 403 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Grist, 147 Idaho
at 51,205 P.3d at 1187.
The district court correctly found B.K.M.'s testimony was not unfairly
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prejudicial. 16

(Tr., p.654, Ls.21-24.)

For the reasons already stated, and

contrary to Marks' claim on appeal, the probative value of B.K.M.'s testimony
was high since it refuted Marks' claims of lack of opportunity and showed a
common scheme or plan to sexually abuse his daughters, which contradicted his
assertions that the claims were made, with Deanna's encouragement, because
the girls were angry. On the other hand, the prejudicial effect was minimal given
that B.K.M.'s testimony about Marks' behavior was essentially no different than
her sisters' testimony. Moreover, prior to B.K.M.'s testimony, the court instructed
the jury as follows:
... [L]adies and gentlemen, you are instructed that evidence is
about to be introduced for the purpose of showing that the
defendant committed crimes or acts other than that for which the
defendant is on tria\. Such evidence, if believed, is not to be
considered by you to prove the defendant's character or that the
defendant has a disposition to commit crimes. Such evidence may
be considered by you only for the limited purpose of proving the
defendant's opportunity, intent, or knowledge.
(Tr., p.1000, Ls.14-22.)
Given the court's limiting instruction and the nature and scope of the non404(b) evidence presented, it cannot be said that there was any legitimate risk
that the jury used B.K.M.'s testimony to decide Marks' guilt on an improper basis.
Marks has failed to show the district court abused its discretion in finding
B.K.M.'s testimony was not unfairly prejudicial.

The transcript reads: "But the prejudice is not substantially outweighed by the
probative value." (Tr., p.654, Ls.23-24.) Because the court found the evidence
admissible, it is apparent this is either an error in the transcript or an accidental
misstatement by the court since the standard should be stated in the reverse the probative value must be substantially outweighed by the prejudice. I.R.E.
403.
16
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Even if the Court concludes the district court erred in allowing B.K.M. to
testify, any error was harmless given the overwhelming nature of the evidence
from the other daughters.

As noted by the district court at sentencing, the

daughters' testimony was credible and corroborated by other evidence.

(Tr.,

p.1345, L.17 - p.1347, L.13.) And, as further noted by the district court at the
Rule 35 hearing, the testimony at trial was "overwhelming" and "compelling."
(Tr., p.1375, Ls.18-20.)

Thus, to the extent error occurred with respect to

B.K.M., the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

III.
Marks Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Marks "asserts that, given any view of the facts," his sentences are

excessive "in light of the mitigating circumstances present in his case, especially
the fact that he passed two polygraph examinations concerning the charges."
(Appellant's Brief, p.25.)

Marks also complains the district court abused its

discretion in denying his Rule 35 motion.

(Appellant' Brief, pp.29-31.)

Application of the correct legal standards to the facts of this case show Marks
has failed to establish the district court abused its sentencing discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v.

Moore, 131 Idaho 814,823,965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland,
125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)).
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C.

Marks Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Imposing Concurrent Unified Life Sentences With 30 Years Fixed
Following The Jury Verdicts Finding Him Guilty Of Engaging In Lewd
Conduct With Three Of His Daughters
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion

standard considering the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho
722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460,
50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838
(2007)).

Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the

burden of demonstrating it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136
Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho
831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).

To carry this burden the appellant must show the

sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho
at 577, 38 P.3d at 615.

A sentence is reasonable, however, if it appears

necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.

J..st.

"[T]he most fundamental requirement [of sentencing] is reasonableness."
State v. Miller,151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (quotations and
citation omitted). "When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court
will make an independent examination of the record, "having regard to the nature
of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public
interest."

J..st.

A review of the record demonstrates that concurrent fixed life

sentences with 30 years fixed imposed for Marks' conduct in engaging in lewd
conduct with his daughters is more than reasonable.
establish otherwise.
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Marks has failed to

In imposing sentence, the district court discussed, in detail, the objectives
of sentencing and how each factored into its decision.

(Tr., p.1349, L.3 -

p.1353, L.2.) The court noted "the most important factor here is protection of the
public" and stated a belief it could "craft a sentence that reasonably protects the
public while giving [Marks] a chance to get out." (Tr., p.1352, LsA-5, p.1352,
L.25 - p.1353, L.2.) That sentence is life with 30 years fixed. (Tr., p.1354, LS.79.) The court reasoned that a lesser fixed term would place Marks at an age at
which he could still be a "danger to the public" and the sentence imposed took
into consideration all relevant information and gave Marks "a little bit of a carrot
towards rehabilitation so that [he] can work towards getting out." (Tr., p.1353,
L.22 - p.1354, L.3.)
Marks contends the district court abused its discretion in imposing
sentence, citing what he calls the "most important mitigating factor" - that he
"passed

two

polygraph

examinations,

taken

two years apart"

and the

polygrapher, both times, expressed an opinion that Marks was being truthful in
his denials. (Appellant's Brief, pp.26-27.) The court was certainly aware of the
polygraph testing, which defense counsel noted at sentencing 17 (Tr., p.1333,
Ls.18-20), but was obviously not persuaded by the results or the polygrapher's
opinion, nor was it required to defer to the polygrapher's opinion.

Unlike the

polygrapher, the district court presided over two trials involving Marks' daughters'
allegations against him and the court found their testimony credible and noted

Interestingly, at the subsequent Rule 35 hearing, defense counsel noted the
polygraphs again but acknowledged it was "not relevant" that Marks passed
them. (Tr., p.1371, L.24 - p.1372, L.2.)
17
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their testimony was corroborated by other witnesses.

(Tr., p.1345, L.17 -

p.1347, L.13.) The jury agreed as indicated by their verdict. That a polygrapher
believes Marks' denials falls far short of demonstrating an abuse of discretion.
Cf. State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873,878,253 P.3d 310, 315 (2011) ("In this
case, although the trial court had evidence before it including the opinions of two
well-regarded mental health professionals regarding Windom's rehabilitative
potential, it was the judge who bore the heavy burden of evaluating whether
Windom would actually comply with rehabilitative programming and whether
such programming would reduce his risk of future violent behavior to an
acceptable leveL").
As for the other mitigating factors cited by Marks - such as his "troubled"
childhood, gainful employment, and the support of his family and friends
(Appellant's Brief, pp.27 -28) sentencing.

the court considered this information at

(Tr., p.1345, Ls.12-14, p.1354, L.5.)

That Marks feels the court

should have given them greater weight also does not establish an abuse of
discretion. See Windom, 150 Idaho at 880,253 P.3d at 317 ("Our standard of
review does not require (nor indeed, does it permit) us to conduct our own
evaluation of the weight to be given each of the sentencing considerations
(societal protection, general and specific deterrence, defendant's prospects for
rehabilitation and societal retribution) in order to determine whether we agree
with the district court's conclusion.").
Marks' sentences are reasonable given any reasonable view of the facts.
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D.

Marks Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Rule 35 Motion
Marks next asserts the district court erred in denying his request for Rule

35 relief. (Appellant's Brief, pp.29-31.) The record shows otherwise.
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this Court reviews the denial
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159 P.3d at
840. A court's decision not to reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion subject to the well-established standards governing whether a
sentence is excessive. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26,28,218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct.
App.2009).
The day after the court entered judgment, Marks filed a Rule 35 motion,
stating it was a "plea for leniency" and requesting a hearing "to present oral
argument and/or testimony in support" of the motion." (R., pp.664, 668.) At the
Rule 35 hearing, Marks testified that his medications changed since sentencing
and he was told by his physician he was "out of [his] head" at the time of trial and
sentencing,18 he had not been in "trouble" during his incarceration other than
"two minors" while in county jail, he was in "pre-sex offender programming" and
was open to programming, and that, according to a guardian ad litem report,
Marks' daughters were "disappointed in the length of the sentence."

(See

generally Tr., pp.1361-1367.)

18 Defense counsel explained that he brought up the medication change because
Marks "doesn't think probably that he should have taken the witness stand or
was really competent to testify." (Tr., p.1370, L.20 - p.1371, L.4.) It is unclear
how this is relevant to Marks' request for Rule 35 relief.
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On cross-examination, and somewhat inconsistent with his implied
assertion that he was no longer "out of [his] head," Marks, when asked whether
he was still denying he sexually offended against his daughters, Marks
responded, in part, that his "brain [was] going sideways." (Tr., p.1368, L.25 p.1369, L.12.) In any event, Marks ultimately answered he was "admitting" he
was found guilty at trial. (Tr., p.1369, Ls.18-23.)
After Marks' testimony, defense counsel reiterated his "understanding"
from the "child protection that [he was] also involved in that the girls think that the
Court's sentence was much longer than it needed to be,,,19 and argued:
I am concerned that Mr. Marks, and with all due respect to
the Court was punished essentially for taking this to trial, for
asserting his right to a trial. Mr. Marks has zero criminal history
behind him on this case, none in all of his years. In addition,
though not relevant, he did pass several polygraphs, full disclosure
polygraphs, indicating his - - that he may have not done that. And I
understand that he was convicted of that, your Honor, and I am not
trying to downplay that. But what I am saying is these are unusual
circumstances.
Mr. Marks is currently in pre SOG training down three right
now, hopefully to get him into treatment. I do not think that he
represents a danger to the community, thought it is arguable
whether he would even be a danger to the girls anymore at this
time. '"
I think right here we have come about as close as we
can to an admission from Mr. Marks over what happened or what
didn't happen. I do believe he is ready to go on any treatment. He
has indicated that he has been a model prisoner, intends on being
a model prisoner, and is not throwing his hands up and just saying I
have life so I might as well not behave. He is in a unit right now
that he can only be in if he behaves good, and he has done so. So
I am asking the Court to reduce the sentence somewhere down

19 Marks' representation that the "girls were disappointed in the length of the
sentence" was based on a report that was not submitted at the Rule 35 hearing
nor was it disclosed to the state; nevertheless, the court indicated it was "willing
to take that for what it is worth." (Tr., p.1366, L.9-p.1367, L.11.)
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into the 15-year period. I am also going to ask the Court to retain
jurisdiction in this case.
(Tr., p.1371, L.20 - p.1372, L.22.)
The court denied Marks' request for a sentence reduction, stating:
The Court has considered the files and records. And, in fact, I sat
through two trials in this case. I watched the excruciating impact of
repeated testimony by the victims. I watched Mr. Marks testify in
absolute denial under cross-examination. 1t was apparent to the
Court that the only concern Mr. Marks had during the trial was his
own well-being. He showed no empathy whatsoever for the victims
at any point. And, yes, it's true, at one point the Court agreed to
not exceed a 15-year term [as contemplated by the binding Rule 11
plea agreement entered into between the first and second trial].
But when that agreement was negotiated, it was specifically
negotiated after the first trial resulted in a hung jury. And I
expressly represented to Mr. Marks that I would agree to that for
only one reason, and that reason was so that the victims didn't
have to go through the trauma of testimony again.
The Court in no way punished Mr. Marks for his choice to
withdraw his plea. I allowed him to do so. Before allowing him to
do so I warned him that if a conviction were going to result from a
second trial, I was not going to limit myself to that 15 years. I would
consider the testimony. I would consider his demeanor at trial.
And I would consider the overall nature of the case.

Rehabilitation is not possible until Mr. Marks acknowledges
the conduct. It is a devil's choice, if you will, when you are
convicted of a crime like this and you believe you are innocent
which Mr. Marks may believe. . .. I ... remember the testimony at
trial. It was overwhelming. It was compelling. The conduct
testified to by the victims was abhorring. And there is no way in
this Court's mind to rehabilitate Mr. Marks until he acknowledges
guilt.
In making the sentence and crafting the sentence the Court
did, the Court wanted in some way to give credence to each of the
victims in the case. The Court is also mindful of the fact that Mr.
Marks at no point has taken any responsibility and, as I indicated,
shown any remorse, shown any concern for anybody but himself.
And the Court at the time of his sentencing and today is convinced
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that the only way to protect the public is to lock Mr. Marks up for a
substantial period of time. And I don't think he should be released
until somebody testifies that he is not a danger. That's the basis
for the indeterminate period ....
The conduct for which the defendant has been convicted will
be front and center in the lives of his victims for the rest of their
lives. They are going to have difficulty ever trusting a man. They
are going to have difficulty ever forming meaningful relationships or
having normal families. It is not unusual in a case where you have
extended periods of traumatic issues as occur in sexual abuse
cases that the victim ultimately show empathy for the perpetrator.
It is called Stockholm syndrome. So I don't put much weight in the
fact that the girls think the sentence is too short [sic]. That's one
responsibility they don't have in the court.
Based upon the statements made by the Court in the record
here this afternoon, I am going to deny the Rule 35 motion.
(Tr., p.1374, L.9 - p.1376, L.24; also R., p.689 (written order denying Rule 35.)
On appeal, Marks argues "[b]oth the spirit of the [victims' rights
amendment to the state constitution] and the specific rights contained therein,
require consideration of a victim's wishes even after sentence has been
imposed."

(Appellant's Brief, p.30.)

According to Marks, "The failure of the

district court to give adequate consideration to the express wishes of the victims
was an abuse of discretion and violated the Idaho Constitution." (Appellant's
Brief, pp.30-31.) This argument has zero merit.
With respect to court proceedings, Article I, section 22, of the Idaho
Constitution grants victims the right "[t]o be heard, upon request, at all criminal
justice proceedings considering a plea of guilty, sentencing, incarceration or
release of the defendant, unless manifest justice would result." K.M. and B.M.
exercised those rights at the sentencing hearing and all three victims provided
written comments to the presentence investigator. (Tr., p.1321, L.25 - p.1325,
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L.7; PSI, pp.3-6.) At no time were the victims deprived of their rights pursuant to
the Idaho Constitution. Indeed, the victims were not even present at the Rule 35
hearing - instead, Marks and his counsel purported to state their position to the
court.

Most importantly, nowhere in the constitution does it state the court is

required to give "adequate consideration" to the victims' wishes vis-a-vis
sentencing.
In any event, Marks cites no authority for the proposition that he can
assert an alleged deprivation of a victim's rights on the victim's behalf and, even
if he could, Article I, section 22(10) specifically precludes any relief "for a
violation of the provisions of [that] section."

Moreover, as aptly noted by the

district court, it considered the victims' alleged views regarding Marks' sentences
but the court was not bound by their wishes. The court's obligation to impose
sentence requires consideration of the sentencing objectives established by law
and the court is not required to defer to the recommendations of any particular
individual. See Windom, supra. Marks' claim to the contrary fails.
Marks has failed to show the district court abused its discretion by
imposing concurrent unified life sentences with 30 years fixed or by refusing to
grant Marks' Rule 35 motion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon the jury verdicts finding Marks guilty of three counts of lewd conduct.
th
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